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Shepherd on Hume’s Argument for the Possibility of Uncaused Existence 
Shepherd’s argument against Hume’s thesis that an object can begin its 
existence uncaused has received short shrift in the secondary literature. I 
argue that the key to understanding that argument’s success is 
understanding its dialectical context. Shepherd sees the dialectical 
situation as follows. Hume presents an argument against Locke and Clarke 
the conclusion of which is that an object can come into existence 
uncaused. An essential premise of that argument is Hume’s theory of 
mental representation. Hume’s theory of mental representation, however, 
is itself implausible and unsupported. Therefore, one need not accept this 
premise or this conclusion. Thus, Shepherd proceeds to her discussion of 
the relation of cause and effect free to help herself to the thesis that every 
beginning of existence must have a cause. Additionally, she elsewhere 
pays down the debt she incurs in that argument by presenting her own 
alternative theory of mental representation, which is both plausible in its 
own right, and can account for the error that she takes Hume to make. 
Keywords: Hume, Shepherd, Causation, Existence 
Despite a recent increase in attention in the work of Lady Mary Shepherd, not 
enough progress has yet been made towards understanding her grand argument against 
Hume’s conclusions regarding necessary connection as particularly successful.1 That 
 
1 My thanks to Louise Daoust, Deborah Boyle, Richard Fry, Miren Boehm, Margo 
Landy, Drew Johnson, and the students in my Spring 2019 seminar at SFSU on Hume 
and Shepherd for discussing earlier versions of the arguments presented here. Thanks 
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grand argument has as an essential premise Shepherd’s foundational thesis that no 
object can begin its existence uncaused. Scholars have struggled to understand what 
Shepherd’s argument for that thesis is, though, since prima facie it appears either to beg 
the question against Hume, or to presuppose elements of Shepherd’s system that she 
presents as depending on it. What I hope to show is that Shepherd’s argument does 
neither. Rather, Shepherd sees that Hume’s argument for the conclusion that a cause of 
existence is not necessary depends for its support of Hume’s theory of mental 
representation. Shepherd, however, rejects that theory as undefended and implausible, 
and elsewhere offers the outlines of a more sophisticated theory of her own, from which 
Hume’s thesis does not follow. Thus, this foundational claim of Shepherd’s neither begs 
the question against Hume, nor requires her to reason in a vicious circle. Rather, it is 
grounded in her rejection of Hume’s theory of mental representation, which rejection 
does not depend on anything specific to her own philosophical system. 
To show this, I will begin with a brief presentation of Shepherd’s argument, and 
a review of the current extant secondary literature on the topic, which is scant, but 
informative. Cristina Paoletti and Jeremy Fantl represent one side of the current 
thinking about Shepherd’s argument: that it is straightforwardly question-begging 
against Hume. Martha Brandt Bolton represents another side: that the dialectic between 
Hume and Shepherd is more subtle, and that to understand Shepherd’s argument 
properly, one has to understand its place in her broader philosophical system. Following 
this review, I will present the details of Hume’s argument for his conclusion that an 
 
also to the anonymous referees at the Journal of Modern Philosophy for their insightful, 
constructive, and helpful feedback.   
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object can begin to exist without a cause. As I understand that argument, it depends 
crucially on Hume’s deployment of his theory of mental representation, so I will begin 
with the details of that theory. Next, I will show that Shepherd has good reason to reject 
Hume’s theory of mental representation, does so on these grounds, and replaces it with 
a theory of mental representation of her own. That is hugely important for 
understanding the form of Shepherd’s argument. Specifically, if Hume only earns his 
conclusion about uncaused if existence via his theory of mental representation, and 
Shepherd rejects that theory for good reasons, and if she replaces that theory with one 
that addresses the failures of Hume’s (even only provisionally), then it is not question 
begging for Shepherd to begin her argument with a claim that derives from this new 
theory of mental representation and that implies the falsity of Hume’s conclusion.2  
Shepherd’s Argument  
As Shepherd herself emphasizes, the thesis at the foundation of her grand 
argument against Hume’s conclusions concerning necessary connection is that, “a Being 
cannot begin its existence of itself”. 
Before I proceed any further, I wish my reader to grant the proposition, “That a 
Being cannot begin its existence of itself;” because I mean to make use of it in 
 
2 It is not question begging because Shepherd does not assume the falsity of Hume’s 
conclusion as one of her premises. Rather, she explicitly rejects one of the premises of 
his argument for good reason. With that premise rejected, Shepherd is no longer 
committed to accepting Hume’s conclusion. This is especially so since she takes 
ordinary usage of the terms ‘cause’ and ‘effect’, Hume’s predecessors’ account of 
mental representation, and her own all to imply its falsity.  
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my further reply to Mr. Hume’s doctrines; and, unless this step is allowed, I can 
make no further progress in this argument. ERCE 39 
Not only does Shepherd declare the importance of this thesis for all that follows it, but 
she frequently refers back to it later in the text, cites it as a premise in several 
arguments, and can plausibly be understood as relying on it precisely as much as she 
announces she will.3 So, Shepherd certainly does take herself to need the conclusion 
that a being cannot begin to exist without a cause, but unfortunately it is less than 
obvious how to understand the argument that she gives in support of it. That argument 
takes the form of a reductio ad absurdum. Here is the imagined scenario that is 
supposed to represent the initial assumption, which will later be rejected.4 
Let the object which we suppose to begin its existence of itself be imagined, 
abstracted from the nature of all objects we are acquainted with, saving in its 
capacity for existence; let us suppose it to be no effect; there shall be no 
prevening circumstances whatever that affect it, nor any existence in the 
universe: let it be so; let there be nought but a blank; and a mass of whatsoever 
 
3 E.g. ERCE 43, 44, 48, 49, 56, 58-9, 67, 83, 101, 103, 121, 142-3, and 193. 
4 The premise to be rejected in the reductio is the thesis that an object can begin its 
existence uncaused. As we will see, that thesis leads to an absurd conclusion when 
combined with an account of mental representation more plausible than Hume’s. So, 
provided that one accepts such an account of mental representation, one ought to reject 
that thesis. Thus, it is Shepherd’s rejection of Hume’s theory of mental representation 
that paves the way for this argument. 
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can be supposed not to require a cause START FORTH into existence, and 
make the first breach on the wide nonentity around ERCE 34-5 
With a great deal of fanfare, detail, and care Shepherd describes what we imagine when 
we imagine a being coming into existence uncaused. It is precisely such a sequence that 
she will argue is impossible. Here is the argument. 
[N]ow, what is this starting forth, beginning, coming into existence, but an 
action, which is a quality of an object not yet in being, and so not possible to 
have its qualities determined nevertheless exhibiting its qualities? […] But my 
adversary allows that, no existence being supposed previously in the universe, 
existence, in order to be, must begin to be and that the notion of beginning an 
action (the being that begins it not supposed yet in existence), involves a 
contradiction in terms; then this beginning to exist cannot appear but as a 
capacity some nature hath to alter the presupposed nonentity, and to act for 
itself, whilst itself is not in being. ERCE 35-65 
Prima facie, one striking problem with this argument is that it seems to beg the question 
against Hume. It appears as though Shepherd’s argument that no being can come into 
existence uncaused is that a description of such an event is a contradiction in terms! If 
true, that would certainly be a knock-down argument, but Shepherd appears to do very 
 
5 It is worth noting that Shepherd rehearses a version of this argument again both later 
in ERCE (143n) and in EPEU (170-1). Shepherd appears to intend those rehearsals to be 
recapitulations of this original and official one, which is also better situated in its 
dialectical context, however one understands that context. So, I will focus my attention 
on this version. 
 
David Landy 
Final Draft. Please cite only the published version in the Journal of Modern Philosophy 
6 
 
little here to demonstrate the truth of that claim. Her argument, such as it is, appears to 
be something like the following: 
1. Beginning, or coming into existence, is an action. 
2. An action is a quality of an object. 
3. If an object can come into existence uncaused, then its beginning can only be a 
quality of that very object itself and no other. 
4. If an object can come into existence uncaused, then its beginning is a quality of 
an object not yet in existence. (1, 2, 3) 
5. An object not yet in existence cannot have its qualities determined. 
6. Thus, a non-existent object must both have qualities (the quality of beginning to 
exist) and not have qualities (because it does not exist).  (4, 5) 
7. Therefore, an object cannot come into existence uncaused. (3, 6) 
Suffice it to say that there is a great deal in that argument that would provide ample 
basis for an objection from Hume. (E.g. 1, 2, 4 and 5 would make for relatively 
straightforward targets.) Of course, some of these steps could receive support from 
Shepherd’s positive accounts of objects as loci of causal powers, of objects rather than 
events being the relata of causal relations, and of cause and effect as synchronous rather 
than successive. The problem with relying on those accounts, however, is that such 
support occurs in the text following this argument, which we have just seen Shepherd 
claims to be the foundation on which those later texts are grounded. 
In light of these prima facie problems with Shepherd’s argument, it is not 
surprising to find scholars commenting on Shepherd evaluating her argument rather 
negatively. For example, Paoletti simply declares that Shepherd’s argument is question 
begging, without presenting any further evidence. 
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Shepherd was not afraid of Hume’s sceptical argument according to which a 
known effect cannot be inferred from an unknown cause. She was instead eager 
to insist that, as causality is a necessary connection, the appearance of the effect 
cannot but imply that its cause produced it; the appearance of an altered effect 
means that a dissimilar cause occurred. As a matter of fact, Shepherd did not 
demonstrate that cause and effect are necessarily connected; she rather took a 
deterministic view of physical phenomena for granted, which allows us to affirm 
that similar events are produced in similar circumstances and that this is true in 
past as well as in future situations. (Paoletti 51) 
In the final sentence here, Paoletti accuses Shepherd of taking determinism for granted, 
but does not explain where she finds Shepherd doing so. Nor does she defend this as an 
interpretation of Shepherd. 
 Fantl, too, accuses Shepherd of begging the question, and while he does take 
more care in explicating the details of Shepherd’s view, he also finds Shepherd’s 
answer to Hume’s thought experiment insufficient.  
Whereas the bundle view of objects and the causal view of properties seem 
like rather contemporary views (even if they do have historical antecedents), 
premise 1 [No object can begin to exist uncaused] and Shepherd’s reasoning 
for it seem rather old-fashioned. Her overall argument, then, is a curious 
mixture of the forward-looking and the nearly medieval. Why suppose that 
beginning to exist is an action of an object at all? For an object to begin to 
exist it need only be the case that one time there is no such object in the 
universe while at the next moment the object is present. Shepherd will worry 
that such a change needs to be caused. But that’s the conclusion of her 
argument; it’s premise 1. It’s not clear why the moving of the universe from 
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a state of lacking such an object to having such an object requires the action 
of any object – the object itself or any other. (Fantl 12) 
Fantl asks “Why suppose that beginning to exist is an action of an object at all?” and 
then performs the same thought exercise that Shepherd rehearses from Hume. He 
imagines a time in which an object does not exist followed by a time in which it does, 
and does not also imagine that object having been caused to begin its existence by 
anything.  
Notice that Fantl’s objection to Shepherd’s argument consists of his rehearsal of 
the very same example that she herself uses to introduce that argument, followed by the 
accusation that she is begging the question against Hume. It is striking, though, that 
Shepherd herself presents this very same example as part of her own argument. This 
suggests that she draws a different lesson from it than Hume and Fantl do. Shepherd 
follows Hume’s instructions to imagine an object, exactly as it is, but without also 
imagining anything to have preceded it; she concedes that we can so imagine an object; 
but she also claims, contra Hume and Fantl, that despite our being able to imagine such 
a thing, it is nonetheless inconceivable for it to actually occur. What is so striking about 
that argument form is that it suggests that Shepherd understands the role of imagination, 
meaning, and possibility in our mental lives very differently than does Hume. Whereas 
Hume concludes from this thought experiment that objects can begin to exist without a 
cause, Shepherd conducts the same experiment and is able to draw no such conclusion. 
Thus, there must be a something, which Shepherd rejects, that Hume takes to license the 
inference from the results of his thought experiment to his conclusion. 
This way of understanding Shepherd’s argument develops a suggestion made by 
Bolton: that Shepherd’s argument here is undergirded by her implicit rejection of the 
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theory of mental representation that leads Hume to his own conclusions with respect to 
uncaused existence and the conceivability test for necessity and possibility.6 
Perhaps most important, although the reasoning sketched may seem to be 
circular, that is just to assume that a cause is necessary, this is not correct.  It is 
based on analysis of the situations in which we experience things that begin to 
exist; there are things which pre-exist the effect, come together and immediately 
produce the effect. […] However, the dispute is not a stand off, as this may 
suggest.  The disagreement concerns competing theories of mind which stand or 
fall on empirical support and explanatory success. (Bolton 2019, 7-9). 
As Bolton sees it, the argument at hand can appear to be circular, but only when one 
reads it in isolation from the broader dialectical situation. Understanding the place of 
that argument in its proper context as part of Shepherd’s more systematic approach to 
issues in the philosophy of mind and metaphysics reveals it to be an entirely appropriate 
response to what Shepherd takes to be the implausible and undefended dogma of 
Humeanism of the day. 
More important, though, the misguided notion of the causal relation receives 
theoretical support from an incorrect account of the intentional content of sense 
perception, as Shepherd sees it. That is to deny that we perceive things as having 
causal connections. We are said to perceive the temporal order of singular events 
and note the regularity with which objects of one sort are succeeded by objects 
of some other sort. Then because the succession of any number of perceived 
 
6 Bolton 2010: 243-4, and also Bolton 2019: section 1. For a discussion of Shepherd’s 
argument in its historical context, see McRobert 2003. 
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events does not constitute a causal connection, belief in the existence of causes 
must have a source extrinsic to perception. […] To Shepherd’s mind, these 
accounts fail to explain both the content and epistemic justification of causal 
beliefs, a lapse traceable to a deficient theory of the conceptual structure of our 
perceptions. […] Intentional content to this effect is built into sensory 
perceptions as a result of a complex perceptual process. As she sees it, sense 
perception involves sensations which are subsumed under ideas of certain 
relations by latent operations of reason. (Bolton 2010, 245) 
As I hope to show, Bolton’s explanation of Shepherd’s general line on Hume’s mistakes 
makes good sense of the passages at hand. Shepherd rehearses Hume’s thought 
experiment with great fanfare. She imagines a world in which first nothing exists, and 
then a moment later something does. Hume concludes from that experiment that it is 
possible that such a series of events could occur. Shepherd refuses to draw this 
inference. Why? Because the inference itself is only valid if one draws a very close 
connection between what we can imagine and what is possible. Shepherd, however, 
does not draw that connection precisely because she takes the imagination itself, or the 
senses, to be part and parcel of a more fundamental representational faculty, perception, 
and holds that pretending to separate the deliverances of the former from those of the 
latter is itself an illicit and misleading piece of philosophical sleight of hand. Or, as 
Bolton has it, idiotcy. 
Hume and Berkeley are cited for advocating an especially impoverished theory 
of perception, on which we perceive nothing but sensations in spatial and 
temporal relations.  
Idiotcy appears to be little else, than an incapacity for further perception 
than what resides in the immediate impressions created by the use of the 
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five organs of sense, and the power of motion … and although I must 
allow that [children] do not, cannot argue formally on the subject … their 
understandings take notice of, (i.e. their latent powers of observation 
enable them to perceive,) certain simple relations in those ideas of 
sensation, which are determined to their minds by the organs of sense. 
(PWMS 2.314) (Bolton 2010, 245-6) 
Again, my plan in what follows is to show that Bolton’s general line on Shepherd can 
be put to use in understanding Shepherd’s argument for the thesis that no object can 
come into existence uncaused. Paoletti and Fantl read this argument in isolation from 
the rest of Shepherd’s systematic approach to these issues, and so take its entire content 
to be contained in a single short paragraph. Bolton’s focus thus far has been on using 
the philosophical system that Shepherd develops in EPEU to situate that paragraph in its 
broader context, as part of Shepherd’s attempt to provide a plausible alterative system to 
Hume’s. What I hope to do is show that a close reading of the text of ERCE itself 
reveals Shepherd’s argument there not only does not beg the question against Hume, but 
in fact contains plausible objections to his argument, and a plausible alternative to his 
conclusion. 
 To see that, we first need a sense of Hume’s theory of mental representation in 
place so that we can better understand Shepherd’s rejection of that theory. To that end, 
the following section will present an interpretation of Hume’s theory. It is not intended 
as a deep or thorough reckoning with the literature on this topic, but rather as a prima 
facie plausible reading of Hume’s theory of mental representation, one that does find 
support in the secondary literature on that topic, and that can be used to make sense of 
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Shepherd’s apparent objections to it.7 It is this last desideratum that is, perhaps, most 
important: to present a tenable reading of Hume that can make sense of Shepherd’s 
argument against him. That is, my goal in the following section will be less to get Hume 
right (although I think I do), than it is to get a version of Hume that plausibly represents 
the Hume to which Shepherd takes herself to object. 
Hume’s Argument 
 Before turning to the details of Hume’s argument against the thesis that, 
“whatever has a beginning, has also a cause of existence,”(T 1.3.3.2; SBN 79), it will be 
helpful to begin earlier in the Treatise with the theses that Hume will use as premises in 
that argument.8 Many of Hume’s arguments depend crucially on his deployment of his 
theory of mental representation, which itself is closely related, but not identical, to his 
famous Copy Principle: that every simple idea is a copy of some simple impression. The 
closely-related theory of mental representation begins with the thesis that all simple 
 
7 I have discussed Hume’s theory of mental representation and its role in the Treatise in 
greater detail in Landy 2012, Landy 2016, Landy 2017, and Landy 2018. Some of my 
presentation here reproduces material from those other discussions. While there is 
certainly not a consensus on what Hume’s theory of mental representation is—or even 
whether he has such a theory, see Cottrell manuscript—what I present here is, I think, at 
least a relatively straightforward reading of the texts. 
8 For citations from Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature I employ the standard 
convention of citing the book, chapter, section, and paragraph number from the 
Clarendon edition, followed by the page number from the Selby-Bigge/Nidditch edition. 
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ideas represent that from which they are copied.9 So, since all simple ideas are copies of 
some simple impressions, simple ideas represent their corresponding simple 
impressions. Of course, complex ideas also represent, but are often not copies of 
anything at all, so this account of representation requires emendation. It becomes 
relatively clear how Hume would emend it in his discussions of the origins of our 
complex ideas of space and time. 
The table in front of me is alone sufficient by its view to give me the idea of 
extension. This idea, then, is borrow’d from, and represents some impression, 
which this moment appears to the senses. But my senses convey to me only the 
impressions of colour’d points, dispos’d in a certain manner. If the eye is 
sensible of any thing farther, I desire it may be pointed out to me. But if it be 
impossible to show any thing farther, we may conclude with certainty, that the 
idea of extension is nothing but a copy of these colour’d points, and of the 
manner of their appearance. T 1.2.3.4; SBN 34, emphasis added 
Our complex idea of a spatial complex comes to represent the spatial complex that it 
does by being a collection of simple ideas of colored points arranged in a way that 
exactly resembles the arrangements of the spatial complex being represented. We 
represent the relation that some simple impressions stand in to one another by arranging 
 
9 Cottrell 2018: 15 argues that the Representational Copy Principle is, in fact, already a 
part of the Copy Principle itself. In Landy 2012 I argue that one must be careful to 
distinguish the Copy Principle from the Representational Copy Principle because 
whereas merely empirical evidence might suffice to establish the former, a different 
kind of evidence is needed to establish the latter. (See fn. 15.)  
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simple representations of each of these impressions into the same relation. We represent 
a as being next to b by placing an idea of a next to an idea of b. The idea of a spatial 
complex is nothing more than a spatial complex of ideas. 
 Hume is clear that our representation of temporal complexes works in the same 
manner. 
The idea of time being deriv’d from the succession of our perceptions of every 
kind, ideas as well as impressions, and impressions of reflection as well as of 
sensation, will afford us an instance of an abstract idea, which comprehends a 
still greater variety than that of space, and yet is represented in the fancy by 
some particular individual idea of a determinate quantity and quality. T 1.2.3.6; 
SBN 34 
Our idea of time is ‘deriv'd from the succession of our perceptions’. Hume's thought is 
that we represent two items as being related, now temporally, by placing them in a 
temporal relation to one another. For example, we represent one thing as happening 
before another by having a representation of the former followed by a representation of 
the latter. So, whereas we represent a spatially complex state of affairs by forming a 
kind of picture before our mind's eye, we represent a temporally complex state of affairs 
by forming a kind of movie there. 
 In general, complex ideas represent the simple impressions that their component 
simple ideas represent as being arranged in the way that those component ideas are 
arranged in the complex. We can generalize this account of complex representation 
using the general schema: 
  ‘x’R‘y’ represents xRy. 
 
David Landy 
Final Draft. Please cite only the published version in the Journal of Modern Philosophy 
15 
 
A representation of x and y as related to one another in way R consists of a 
representation of x related in the same way, R, to a representation of y.10 A 
representation of a spatial complex is a spatial complex of representations, a mental 
picture. A representation of a temporal complex is a temporal complex of 
representations, a mental movie. Etc. As I have indicated, I believe that Hume deploys 
this theory of mental representation many times throughout the Treatise as an essential 
step in many of his most important arguments. It will be worthwhile to consider one 
particularly relevant example, namely, his use of it in his argument for the thesis that we 
can have no idea of necessary connection. 
‘Tis easy to observe, that in tracing this relation, the inference we draw from 
cause to effect, is not deriv’d merely from a survey of these particular objects, 
and from such a penetration into their essences as may discover the dependance 
 
10 Of course, this is not the only interpretation of Hume’s theory of mental 
representation. Cohon and Owen 1997, Garrett 2006, Schafer 2015, and Cottrell 
manuscript are some excellent recent alternatives. Cohon and Owen cast representation 
more straightforwardly as copying itself. Garrett proposes that a representation 
represents that to which it is causally or functionally isomorphic. Schafer presents 
textual and philosophical objections to Garrett, and concludes that we ought to 
understand having accuracy conditions as the essential feature of Hume’s theory of 
representation. Cottrell argues backward-looking causal accounts of representation, 
ssuch as any that cast copying as playing a central role, cannot handle certain claims 
that Hume makes about the passions, and proposes a forward-looking alternative 
according to which a perception is a representation just in case it is used as a model. 
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of the one upon the other. There is no object, which implies the existence of any 
other if we consider these objects in themselves, and never look beyond the 
ideas which we form of them. Such an inference wou’d amount to 
[demonstrable] knowledge, and wou’d imply the absolute contradiction and 
impossibility of conceiving any thing different. But as all distinct ideas are 
separable, ’tis evident there can be no impossibility of that kind. When we pass 
from a present impression to the idea of any object, we might possibly have 
separated the idea from the impression, and have substituted any other idea in its 
room. T 1.3.6.1, SBN 86-87 
Hume’s first premise here is that if “the inference we draw from cause to effect [were] 
deriv’d merely from a survey of these particular objects,” it would, “imply the absolute 
contradiction and impossibility of conceiving any thing different.” To “derive” the 
inference from cause to effect from a survey of objects would be for that inference to 
copy the relations of those objects to each other. If the copied relation is to be a 
necessary connection, then to be a copy of it, the ideas representing each of the relata 
would likewise have to be necessarily connected to each other. That is, to represent a 
necessary connection between distinct objects, would require a necessary connection 
between the distinct ideas representing these. To plug these values into the above 
schema: 
 (‘x’ necessarily connected to ‘y’) represents (x necessarily connected to y). 
To represent two objects as necessarily connected, the idea of each of the objects 
represented would themselves have to be necessarily connected. As Hume points out, 
though, no two distinct ideas are necessarily connected to each other. We can always 
entertain the idea of the cause without also thinking of the effect, and vice versa. Thus, 
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since the representing simple ideas are not necessarily connected, the complex idea that 
they constitute cannot represent a necessary connection. 
 Of course, in addition to rejecting Hume’s thesis concerning the beginning of 
existence, Shepherd will also reject his claims here about necessary connection. 
Specifically, Shepherd holds that objects do imply the existence of other objects,11 that 
an inference from one to the other does amount to demonstrable knowledge,12 and that 
this does imply the absolute contradiction and impossibility of conceiving any thing 
different.13 What we are after here, though, is her grounds for doing so, and what I want 
to suggest is that the common root of these disagreements (and more besides) between 
Hume and Shepherd is their radically different theories of mental representation. 
 To demonstrate that last claim, we can now turn to the very specific use to which 
Hume puts the example that we have seen Shepherd cite from 1.3.3 “Why a cause is 
always necessary.” Again, Hume leverages that example to refute the thesis that, 
“Whatever has a beginning has also a cause of existence”(T 1.3.3.2; SBN 79). What we 
can see now is that that argument, like the one against the idea of necessary connection, 
also relies on Hume’s theory of mental representation. 
But here is an argument, which proves at once, that the foregoing proposition is 
neither intuitively nor demonstrably certain. We can never demonstrate the 
necessity of a cause to every new existence, or new modification of existence, 
without shewing at the same time the impossibility there is, that any thing can 
 
11 E.g. ERCE 49. 
12 E.g. ERCE 92-3. 
13 E.g. ERCE 55. 
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ever begin to exist without some productive principle; and where the latter 
proposition cannot be prov'd, we must despair of ever being able to prove the 
former. Now that the latter proposition is utterly incapable of a demonstrative 
proof, we may satisfy ourselves by considering, that as all distinct ideas are 
separable from each other, and as the ideas of cause and effect are evidently 
distinct, 'twill be easy for us to conceive any object to be non-existent this 
moment, and existent the next, without conjoining to it the distinct idea of a 
cause or productive principle. T 1.3.3.3; SBN 79-80, emphasis added 
Notice that Hume begins this argument by specifying that his target is those who would 
claim that we can demonstrate that every beginning of existence must have a cause. As 
we saw above with the case of necessary connection, the idea here is that to demonstrate 
that every beginning has a cause would imply that the opposite claim—that some 
beginnings do not have a cause—is a contradiction. Hume’s proof, then, takes the form 
of demonstrating that this latter claim is not, in fact, a contradiction. He does so by 
doing nothing more than presenting the example that Shepherd later cites. I.e. he 
prompts us to notice that for any object of which can form an idea, we can also imagine 
that object being non-existent one moment, and then existing the next, without also 
having to imagine anything else. 
 Notice, though, that that imaginative exercise only shows that the thesis at hand 
is not a contradiction if there is a strong connection between what we can imagine and 
what we can represent. As Hume frames his argument, it is intended to show that the 
proposition that ‘whatever has a beginning has also a cause of existence’ cannot be 
given a demonstrative proof. What would such a proof look like if it could be given? 
Well, it would show that there is something in the very idea of a beginning that implies 
that such a thing must have a cause.  That is, it would show that the idea of ‘beginning’ 
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and ‘cause’ are necessarily connected. Or, to put it into the schema from above, it would 
be a representation of the form, 
 ‘beginning’ necessarily connected to ‘cause’. 
Thus, the way that Hume’s example operates is precisely to undermine the suggestion 
that we can form any such representation. Our ability to imagine a beginning without 
also imagining a cause shows that the ideas of ‘beginning’ and ‘cause’ are not, in fact, 
necessarily connected. Thus, the above schema is not instantiated, and so it cannot be 
demonstrated that whatever has a beginning also has a cause of existence. Hume’s 
argument here, as in the more straightforward case of the idea of necessary connection 
(and many others) is an application of his theory of mental representation. 
Shepherd’s Rejection of Hume’s Conclusion 
 Now, back to Shepherd. In light of the way that we have seen Hume’s argument 
operate, what is so striking about Shepherd’s engagement with it is that she specifically 
deploys the very same example that Hume does, concedes to him that the example 
succeeds, but denies that Hume’s conclusion follows from that fact. Here is that text 
again. 
Let the object which we suppose to begin its existence of itself be imagined, 
abstracted from the nature of all objects we are acquainted with, saving in its 
capacity for existence; let us suppose it to be no effect; there shall be no 
prevening circumstances whatever that affect it, nor any existence in the 
universe: let it be so; let there be nought but a blank; and a mass of whatsoever 
can be supposed not to require a cause START FORTH into existence, and make 
the first breach on the wide nonentity around (ERCE 34-5) 
Here we see Shepherd absolutely belabor the point that she can concede to Hume that 
we can imagine an object without also imagining what precedes it, and even that we can 
 
David Landy 
Final Draft. Please cite only the published version in the Journal of Modern Philosophy 
20 
 
imagine an object coming to exist in an utter blank. (By my count she says as much six 
times in that single sentence.) She goes on, however, to ask, 
[N]ow, what is this starting forth, beginning, coming into existence, but an 
action, which is a quality of an object not yet in being, and so not possible to 
have its qualities determined, nevertheless exhibiting its qualities? (ERCE 35) 
Shepherd accepts that we can imagine an object beginning to exist without also 
imagining its cause of existence, but then immediately (in the very same sentence) 
wonders what such a beginning could be other than an action of an object not yet in 
being, etc. That Shepherd accepts that we can imagine such a thing, and yet also rejects 
that this suffices to demonstrate that the proposition, ‘whatever has a beginning has also 
a cause of existence’, cannot be proven implies that Shepherd also rejects Hume’s 
theory of mental representation. That is, the dialectic to this point proceeds as follows. 
Hume proposes his theory of mental representation: that a complex idea represents the 
objects of its simple components as being arranged as those simples are in that complex. 
Hume combines this theory with the fact that we can imagine an object beginning to 
exist without also imagining that beginning to have a cause, to conclude that we cannot 
represent that the beginning of an object must have a cause. Shepherd agrees that we 
can imagine an object beginning without also imagining that beginning to have a cause, 
but rejects Hume’s conclusion that this shows that we cannot represent that the 
beginning of an object must have a cause. On what grounds might she do so? My 
proposal is that she rejects Hume’s theory of mental representation. I.e. Shepherd rejects 
the very close tie that Hume supposes there is between imagination and representation. 
 As further evidence for this understanding of Shepherd’s position, notice that the 
very next point that she makes after rejecting Hume’s use of this example, is to offer an 
alternative account of how that example operates, and to use that account to derive 
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precisely the opposite of Hume’s conclusion: that the idea of a beginning without a 
cause contains a contradiction. 
But, my adversary allows that, no existence being supposed previously in the 
universe, existence, in order to be, must begin to be, and that the notion of 
beginning an activity (the being that begins is not supposed yet in existence), 
involves a contradiction in terms; then this beginning to exist cannot appear but 
as a capacity some nature hath to alter the presupposed nonentity, and to act for 
itself, whilst itself is not in being.—The original assumption may deny, as much 
as it pleases, all cause of existence; but, whilst in its very idea, the 
commencement of existence is an effect predicated of some supposed cause, 
(because the quality of an object which must be in existence to possess it,) we 
must conclude that there is no object which begins to exist, but must owe its 
existence to some cause. (ERCE 35-6, emphasis mine) 
Notice that Shepherd’s argument against Hume is that “in its very idea” the 
commencement of existence is an effect predicated of some supposed cause, and 
therefore, it is “a contradiction in terms” to suppose that an object begins to exist 
without a cause. For the very idea of the commencement of existence to be an effect 
predicated of some cause, given that Shepherd accepts that we can imagine a beginning 
of existence without imagining its cause, it must be that the idea of a commencement of 
existence is something over and above whatever it is that we imagine when considering 
such an example.14 For Hume, however, it is not. For Hume, the idea of a beginning just 
 
14 Miren Boehm raises the following worry here. For Hume, when we imagine 
something, we represent it to be a certain way, whereas as I understand Shepherd, for 
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her this is not the case. For Shepherd, what Hume calls “imagining” is merely forming a 
mental picture, but is not yet a representation of anything as anything. To actually 
imagine a beginning would require forming a representation of a beginning as, say, the 
formation of a new effect by the combination of some causes. If, however, Shepherd 
and Hume mean different things by ‘imagine’, then Shepherd is not really agreeing with 
Hume about what we can imagine at all. I mostly agree with Boehm on this point, and 
would give a similar treatment to ‘imagine’ here as I do to Shepherd’s discussion of 
Hume’s illicit use of ‘cause’ below.  
An example helps clarify the issue. Suppose one follows Hume’s instructions 
and “pictures” a fire, without also picturing any cause of it. The picture of that fire 
consists of certain colored points arranged in a certain manner. What I take Shepherd to 
concede is that, through a process of abstraction that begins with a perception of fire 
as locus of causal powers, one can form such an image, such an arrangement of colored 
points in one’s mind’s eye. “Let the object which we suppose to begin its existence of 
itself be imagined, abstracted from the nature of all objects we are acquainted with, 
saving in its capacity for existence”(ERCE 34). Where Shepherd departs from Hume is 
precisely in taking these colored points by themselves to be representations in anything 
but a sense that is extended past credulity. To take these colored points to be what 
Hume takes them to be, a representation of a beginning, one needs to (re)enrich these 
points with precisely those resources that were subtracted from them in the process of 
abstraction: namely, their causal role. 
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is the imagining of a beginning. Shepherd rejects that account of mental representation, 
suggests how an alternative theory should account for the same example, and is thus not 
beholden to the conclusion that Hume derives from his own theory. 
 Of course, one might object on Hume’s behalf that while Shepherd clearly does 
reject Hume’s theory of mental representation, and the conclusion that he derives from 
it, she nonetheless fails to cite the reasons that ground that rejection. That objection 
would be hold more water if either (a) Hume’s theory was particularly plausible,15 or (b) 
Hume himself had given reasons in support of it.16 Nevertheless, Shepherd does at least 
 
15 It has long been recognized that Hume’s imagism is both a strength and weakness of 
his view. In Landy 2007 and Landy 2009 I give more careful consideration to that issue 
as well as other reasons for ultimately rejecting Hume’s theory.  
In conversation, Martha Bolton has suggested that it is conceivability more 
broadly that drives philosophers to accept Hume’s argument, rather than his specific 
imagistic understanding of what we can or cannot conceive. That is an excellent point, 
the answer to which would require moving beyond the scope of the current, more 
narrow study. The first step in understanding Shepherd’s argument is to understand how 
she takes it to constitute a response to Hume. That is the purpose of this paper. It is only 
once we have done that, that we can proceed to investigating whether and what 
independent evidence Shepherd can marshal for the own account of perception with 
which she supplants Hume’s, and how it would then fare against other competitors. 
16 In Landy 2012 I argue that the best that Hume can do on this score is cast his theory 
of mental representation as a kind of analysis of the revival set for the general term 
‘representation’ along the lines of the other analyses that he provides throughout the 
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point out that the targets of Hume’s argument themselves would not have accepted his 
theory of mental representation, and for that reason did not bother to address themselves 
to his potential objection. 
It is undoubtedly true, that these authors [Dr. Clarke and Mr. Locke] assumed 
that which was in question; namely, that every existence must have a cause; but, 
as every thing not yet in existence, to exist at all, must begin, and the beginning 
of any thing must always be supposed, by the nature of the action, to be a 
quality of something in existence, which existence is yet DENIED by the 
statement of the question, these philosophers felt the involved absurdity so great, 
that they passed over the first question as too ridiculous, probably, to consider 
formally; then showed, that the mind of man was forced to look upon all thing 
which begin to exist as dependent QUALITIES; and thus, that an object could 
neither depend upon itself for existence, not yet upon nothing. (ERCE 37) 
If Shepherd is right that Clarke and Locke understood our representation of beginning in 
a way that presupposes the existence of an object that undertakes this activity, then she 
is on firm footing in rejecting Hume’s argument to the contrary as begging the question 
against them (so long as she does not find in Hume an argument against their account of 
representation). 
 
Treatise, e.g. of the ideas of space, time, body, cause, self, etc. In this regard, it is 
important to distinguish between the empirical evidence that Hume takes himself to 
adduce in favor of the Copy Principle from the philosophical considerations that 
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 This dialectic comes to a head in the next paragraph where Shepherd returns to 
the limiting role that Hume assigns to the imagination. 
Let it be remembered, too, that although Mr. Hume inveighs against this method 
[of Dr. Clarke and Mr. Locke] as sophistical, by conceiving it begs the question, 
yet his own argument, the whole way, consists in the possibility of imagining an 
effect “non-existent” this minute,” and “existing the next;” and does not himself 
consider any other “sort of being” possible; and has no other way of supporting 
his own notion of the beginning of existence by itself, except under the idea of 
an effect in suspense; which is still a relative term, and begs the question for the 
necessity of its correlative, i.e. its cause, just as much as he asserts his 
adversaries do, whom he declares to be illogical reasoners. (ERCE 37-8) 
Shepherd reiterates her two related objections to Hume here. The first is that his entire 
argument “consists in the possibility of imagining an effect “non-existent” this minute,” 
and “existing the next;” and he does not himself consider any other “sort of being” 
possible.” That is, Hume’s entire argument consists of his citing our ability to imagine a 
beginning without imagining its cause. If, however, one is not convinced that the limits 
of our imagination are the limits of what we can represent, as Shepherd is clearly not, 
then this example is insufficient to demonstrate Hume’s conclusion. Shepherd’s second 
objection is that once one adopts her more plausible account of what we represent when 
we represent objects, or even just returns to the conception employed by Hume’s own 
opponents, the contradiction that Hume could not find using his own theory of mental 
representation is obvious: an effect is an effect of a cause, and so cannot exist without it. 
 In fact, Shepherd lays the foundation for this conclusion—that it is only by 
illicitly replacing the ordinary meanings of the words ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ with those in 
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accordance with his own theory of mental representation that Hume’s argument can so 
much as get off the ground—before she presents her argument at all.17 
But before examining this notion […] it will be necessary to render the 
expressions in which it is conveyed more intelligible. This can in no way be 
done so long as the definition of the word effect presupposed a cause, for the 
supposition of the objection lies in its being possible for effects to be held in 
suspense: but in order that this should be possible, the meaning of the word 
effect must be altered.  
Then, if the ideas are altered that lie under the term, according as the varied 
occasion seems to require, there can be no philosophy; and it never can be 
insisted on, that the effects, which are supposed to be conjoined with their causes 
at one period of time […] can again, upon another occasion, not be effects 
(ERCE 30-1) 
‘Cause’ and ‘effect’ as they are ordinarily used are co-defined, and it is a straightforward 
contradiction in terms to suppose that a cause qua cause could exist without an effect, or 
vice versa. A cause is a cause of an effect, and an effect is the effect of some cause. It is 
only by changing the meaning of those terms that Hume’s argument does not fail 
immediately, but once one has noticed that this change of meaning has occurred, it is 
important to take account of the consequences of the change. 
 
17 My thanks to Edwin Wolf for drawing my attention to the importance of these 
passages for Shepherd’s argument, and for clarifying their meaning. Wolf and Steven 
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To make, therefore, anything like a rational meaning in this sentence of Mr. 
Hume’s, nothing more can be intended by it, than that we should imagine, those 
existences which we always observe conjoined with others in such a manner, 
that they appear to be their effects, properties, or qualities, to owe them no real 
existence or dependence; and therefore capable of being independent objects, 
and of beginning their own existence. (ERCE 31-2) 
In changing the meaning of ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ in such a way that to claim that an effect 
can exist uncaused is not a contradiction in terms, Hume shifts the meaning of these 
terms from referring to actual causes and effects to referring to merely apparent causes 
and effects. Correspondingly, though, it is no surprise that he is able to deduce that 
merely apparent causes and effects can be coherently imagined as being independent of 
one another. Once one stipulates that these objects might not be causally related, no 
examination of their intrinsic properties or other relations to one another should be 
expected to yield a demonstration that they are, in fact, causally related. 
 Furthermore, this objection of Shepherd’s to Hume’s procedure is supported by 
aspects of her own philosophical system that run deeper than what she takes to be 
Hume’s illicit linguistic machinations. To see this, we need examine Shepherd’s own, 
more plausible, account of the representation of cause of and effect, which I mentioned 
a few moments ago. Unfortunately, no such account is presented at this point in the text, 
nor in any detail in the remainder of ERCE. Shepherd appears content there to have 
shown that Hume begs the question against Locke and Clarke, and that she is therefore 
licensed to abandon his conclusion and pursue her own account of what our idea of 
cause and effect really is. She does, however, give a more detailed account elsewhere, 
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namely in her Essays on the Perception of External Universe (EPEU).18 To fully 
understand her argument against Hume’s analysis of cause and effect, then, it is worth 
delving into that text at least a bit. 
 We can begin that exploration with a passage, like the one regarding the 
beginning of existence above, that appears to be specifically designed to engage Hume’s 
account of mental representation on its own terms. This time Shepherd adopts Hume’s 
example of our idea of a table, which he casts as being nothing more than what his 
senses convey to him: “only the impressions of colour’d points, dispos’d in a certain 
manner.” Here is Shepherd’s account of the representation of the same table. 
Now the truth is, that no real table is formed, no image of a table is formed, 
unless the whole united mass of the unknown objects in nature exterior to, and 
independant of the instruments of sense, (not yet worthy of the name of 
“TABLE,”) unite with the mechanical action of these, and by their means with 
the sentient principle, in order to create such an union that object which alone 
 
18 Again, it is worth noting here that Shepherd is explicit that her own theory of mental 
representation, presented in EPEU, is itself supported by the conclusions she draws in 
ERCE (EPEU xii-xiii). Thus, the particulars of Shepherd’s alternative to Hume’s theory 
of mental representation are not themselves included in any premise of her argument 
against Hume. To that end, all she needs is the claim that some (perhaps more plausible) 
alternative theory is possible (e.g. that of Locke and Clarke, or even just of ordinary 
discourse). I present Shepherd’s own account only to show what it might look like to 
have a theory of mental representation other than Hume’s, and which would cast ‘cause’ 
and ‘effect’ as necessarily connected. 
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can properly be termed “TABLE.” Yet after experience, the outward OBJECTS, 
the CONTINUALLY EXISTING PARTS of the whole causes necessary to the 
creation of a table, must be named by the name by which the whole is named; 
for there is no other name whereby they can be called, nor any other ideas by 
which the memory of them can be introduced into the mind, save by the 
appearance of “the faint images of those sensible qualities” which their presence 
originally created. (EPEU 148-9) 
Shepherd’s account of the representation of a table seems to be something like the 
following. First, draw a distinction between what we see, a table, and what we see of 
what we see, say, the facing surface of the top of the table. While “the faint images of 
[the] sensible qualities” of the table in some sense represent just the sensible qualities 
that correspond to the seen parts of the table, say a rectangular patch of brown, what our 
idea of the table represents, is precisely that such sensible qualities are the result of our 
perspectival encounter with a table, which comprises many other possible and actual 
sensible qualities united by the idea of the table as their common cause. ‘Table’ is the 
name of a complete object, not just the name of certain of the sensible qualities that 
such an object excites in the mind of someone perceiving it.19 
 Thus, while Hume attempts to construct the idea of a table from just these faint 
images of sensible qualities, that is a deliberately impoverished approach, which 
 
19 Atherton 1996: 355-6 investigates the grounds of Shepherd’s analysis of the idea of 
an object in the context of her arguments against Berkeley. 
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Shepherd clearly rejects, and rejects for the very reason that Hume himself embraces!20 
I.e. Shepherd and Hume agree that one cannot construct the notion of the table as a 
continual existent locus of causal powers from the sensible qualities alone. Hume 
concludes that we have no such idea of the table. Shepherd concludes that we must have 
representative resources over and above those afforded by the table’s sensible qualities.  
It is thus by a union of observation and reason, coalescing with the conscious 
use of the senses, that we are enabled justly to affirm, that “outward objects are 
perceived immediately by sense.” (EPEU 57) 
The table, qua table, is represented not by just the senses, but by a union of observation 
and reason. The faint images of the sensible qualities of the table, e.g. its color, might be 
perceived by the senses alone, but the table as the object of one’s perception, can only 
be represented as such via a combination of senses and reason. The table as the object of 
one’s perception is represented as that which causes those faint images, and so the 
images themselves, which do not themselves contain the idea of a cause, must be 
supplemented by this contribution from reason. In fact, even that strong connection 
between these two faculties undersells Shepherd’s account. As Shepherd sees it, there is 
 
20 Of course, there are other elements of Hume’s system, such as the contributions of 
memory and imagination, but these too are merely operations over sensible qualities. 
Again, there might well be a more sophisticated interpretation of Hume’s texts here that 
according to which his theory is more like the one that Shepherd proposes. The point, 
however, is that using this fairly straightforward reading of Hume, we can make good 
sense of how Shepherd’s argument is supposed to work. 
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actually only a single faculty at work in perception, and “the senses” and “reason” are 
abstractions of different aspects of this faculty.21 
Now I repeat there is one sense in which it may be said that objects are 
perceived immediately, as existing outwardly, by the senses. It is this; the 
conscious powers of the understanding, and the senses, are blended together in 
man; we are analysing them, but in nature they are united as intimately as are 
the prismatic colors in one uniform mass of light. (EPEU 67) 
A representation of a table as a table, as existing outwardly by the senses, is the result of 
the faculty of perception, which itself already contains the understanding and the senses 
as parts “united as intimately as are the prismatic colors in one uniform mass of light.”  
Hume thinks of his theory of mental representation as bringing philosophers 
“back to basics”.22 What we can think is derived from impressions, and impressions 
consist in nothing other than sensible qualities. As Shepherd sees it, though, it is Hume 
who has imported into his theory certain confounding theoretical commitments. 
Specifically, while perception can be analyzed in terms of the contributions of “the 
senses” and “reason”, in its most basic form, it is a unity of these faculties. “The senses” 
themselves are an abstraction from a more basic representational faculty, and Hume’s 
separating off this faculty and deeming it the only legitimate source of representational 
content is a perversion.  
 
21 As an anonymous referee at the Journal of Modern Philosophy points out, this claim 
of Shepherd’s would take at least an entire other paper to explicate in the detail it 
deserves. For now, this quick gloss must suffice. 
22 Cf. T 1.1.1.1n2; SBN 2. 
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Now objects in our conscious apprehensions […] are not only blue or red, sweet 
or sour, hard or soft, beautiful or ugly, warm or cold, loud or low; but the ideas 
of their causes are included in their names as continually existing, and that even 
when the organs of sense are shut. (EPEU 135.) 
The name ‘table’ stands for a certain object, which is for Shepherd, first and foremost, a 
certain locus of causal powers, including but not limited to the power to cause in a 
perceiver certain sensible qualities.23 In very rough outline, that is Shepherd’s account 
of the mental representation of objects, including her account of where Hume (and 
Berkeley and others) go wrong. It might have made her case against Hume in ERCE 
 
23 Here are two more examples that Shepherd offers. 
Therefore fire in order to have a right to the sign of the word fire, for an 
expression of its attributes, in order to be a “like cause,” must of necessity burn 
as much as it must be red, otherwise the red object were not fire; and could not 
have been produced by those causes that, elicit that element. (ERCE 54) 
It follows then from the definitions given in the preceding section, and the 
reasonings on which they are formed, that, were a body, in all other respects 
resembling snow, to have the taste of salt and feeling of fire, it would be an 
extraordinary phenomenon, no doubt; and one which might for ought we know 
take place, but it would not be snow; and such a body could not fall from the 
clouds but by new causes efficient to its formation—it would, therefore, be 
entirely a different object, and would require a new name; and the phenomenon 
could offer no ground for the conclusion, that reason does not afford an 
argument, for the expectation of similar effects from similar causes. (ERCE 68) 
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clearer if she had included it there, but as I pointed out earlier, this account is not strictly 
speaking dialectically necessary there, because all she needs there is grounds to reject 
Hume’s conclusion that there can be a beginning of existence without a cause. She does 
that by showing that Hume’s argument for that conclusion is question begging, and does 
not also need, at that moment in that context, to offer a detailed alternative to what she 
more-or-less rightly takes to be his implausible and unsupported theory of mental 
representation. That she presents such an alternative elsewhere (in a book that was 
originally intended as an extension of ERCE) is so much dialectical and philosophical 
icing on the cake. 
The Status of Shepherd’s Argument 
 By way of conclusion, I would like to revisit the quick-and-dirty reconstruction 
of Shepherd’s positive argument for the conclusion that an object cannot come into 
existence uncaused that I presented earlier. Here is that reconstruction again. 
1. Beginning, or coming into existence, is an action. 
2. An action is a quality of an object. 
3. If an object can come into existence uncaused, then its beginning can only be a 
quality of that very object itself and no other. 
4. If an object can come into existence uncaused, then its beginning is a quality of 
an object not yet in existence. (1, 2, 3) 
5. An object not yet in existence cannot have its qualities determined. 
6. Thus, a non-existent object must both have qualities (the quality of beginning to 
exist) and not have qualities (because it does not exist).  (4, 5) 
7. Therefore, an object cannot come into existence uncaused. (3, 6) 
Earlier I noted that that there appears to be a great deal in this argument to which Hume 
could object. I also noted that while some of these steps could receive support from 
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Shepherd’s positive accounts of objects from sections farther along in ERCE, such 
resources appear to be disallowed at this point in the text, insofar as Shepherd indicates 
that it is her conclusion here that will provide the foundation for those later theses, not 
the other way around. What we can now see is that the dialectic surrounding this 
argument is more subtle than it first appears. While Hume can raise objections to some 
of Shepherd’s premises here, if those objections depend on his theory of mental 
representation, and if the foregoing account of Shepherd’s rejection of that theory is 
roughly correct, then Shepherd is free to employ those premises, despite these 
objections, because she takes herself to have good reason to reject their underpinnings. 
For example, consider 1 and 2: the beginning or coming into existence is an 
action or quality of some object. On what grounds might Hume object to that premise? 
Well, one such ground might be that we can imagine a beginning or coming into 
existence without also imagining “an object” of which that beginning is an action. 
Suppose, however, that Shepherd is justified in rejecting Hume’s imagistic theory of 
mental representation, and also justified in replacing it with her own conception of 
representation according to which Hume’s “impressions” and “ideas” are mere 
abstractions from a more fundamental representational faculty that represents the world 
as consisting of objects existing in space, persisting through time, and necessarily 
connected to one another and to the perceiver. In that case, Shepherd would be further 
justified in holding that Hume’s objection rests on illicit grounds, and that the notions of 
a “beginning” or an “action” or a “quality” are themselves essential components of the 
idea of an object, which object is fundamentally conceived of as a locus of necessary 
causal relations. The details of such a move, or corresponding moves that might be 
made with respect to her other premises here, must be left for another occasion, but 
notice more broadly that if these kinds of moves are available to Shepherd, then her 
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argument is in better dialectical standing than scholars have previously recognized. 
So, the key to unsderstanding Shepherd’s positive argument here is to 
understand that dialectical context. Shepherd takes Hume’s argument to beg to the 
question against his own opponents insofar as it rests on his undefended and 
implausible theory of mental representation. Having rejected that theory of mental 
representation, Shepherd is free to make her argument relying on what she takes 
to be a more plausible account. Thus, Shepherd’s argument is not question 
begging: she rejects the assumptions on which Hume’s objections to it would be 
based and proceeds to argue unhindered by these assumptions. Her argument also 
has a claim to prima facie plausibility insofar as it is grounded in our ordinary 
usage of the words ‘cause’, ‘effect’, ‘beginning’, ‘action’, etc. and a 
comparatively plausible account of the content of the ideas that correspond to 
those words. Thus, while I will not render a verdict on the ultimate success of 
Shepherd’s argument, what I hope to have shown is that her argument is not the 
obvious failure that scholars have taken it to be.  
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